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Headline: Getting due diligence right 
Getting due diligence right 
Effective due diligence is one of the most important tasks in negotiation and there are a few traps that deal makers must avoid 
By MICHAEL BENOLIEL 
A MONG the serially successful deal makers are Bain & Company, a top-tier private equity firm; Cinven, a leading European private equity firm; Teva, an Israeli gener- ic pharmaceutical company; and Nestle, a Swiss conglomerate and textbook acquir- er. These companies know how to avoid the traps of poor due diligence, have a dis- 
ciplined due diligence process, and know how to create 
value through superior negotiation capabilities. 
However, the industrywide record of creating value 
through mergers and acquisitions is poor. A study by 
KPMG Internationa! in 1999, for example, looked at share- 
holder returns on mergers relative to the performance of 
other companies in the same industry one year after th? 
announcement of the merger. Using this commonly used 
standard of success, they found that "83 per cent of mer- 
gers failed to unlock value". Clearly, there are many rea- 
sons as to why deal makers fail to create sustainable val- 
ue. 
In this article, however, I will focus only on a few traps 
of 'due diligence that apply to all types of negotiations and 
how to avoid them. 
Hubris 
Hubris or overconfidence is a cognitive bias that can influ- 
ence decisions. Overconfident CEOs, for example, are 
prone to information judgment error. 
They believe that they hold more information than 
they actually have, consider their own information more 
valuable than external information, and make decisions 
based more on subjective judgment than on objective in- 
formation. consequently, they pay higher premiums for 
their deals and end up with more value-destroying deals. 
Hubris illso drives deal makers to overestimate the fu- 
ture benefits and underestimate the future costs of trans- 
actions. 
A study by McKinsey & Company found that the aver- 
age acquirer materially overestimated the synergies that 
come from economies of scale and scope, best practices, 
or sharing capabilities, and ignored dis-synergies arising, 
for example, from loss of customers. 
In negotiation, what you do not know may be often 
more important than what you know. Thus, negotiators 
should restrain the ego and value more valid data. 
Information availability bias 
Negotiators tend to collect information from easily availa- 
ble sources and do not invest enough resources in collec- 
ting information from not easily available sources of infor- 
mation. Consequently, they make decisions that are based 
on a limited subset of information. 
In contrast, effective deal makers, such as John Con- 
naughton with Bain Capital, recognise the limited value of 
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True colourz: Newel1 Rubbermaid Sharpie markers sit on display a t  an Ofice Depot store. Under time pressure. 
Newel1 had raced through the due diligence process and failed to discover that Rubbermaid 'perfumed' itself 
secondary and easily available information. 
He said: "We throw away the secondary research and 
build our point of view from the bottom up." 
Similarly, Cinven also builds its point of view from the 
ground up by using its own team of analysts to collect in- 
formation from primary sources of information. 
For example, prior to acquiring Odeon Cinemas, Cin- 
ven sent its teams of analysts to "hang out at the movies" 
and collect information from the field on each theatre site. 
It was not the typical "data room" analysis. This clearly 
gave Cinven a better understanding of Odeon. 
In negotiation, valid information is king! Deal makers 
must be willing to invest resources in getting information 
from easily and not easily available sources of informa- 
tion. . .-
Confirmatory bias and deal fever 
promised by using optimistic assumptions and underesti- 
mating the downside risk. 
But not Benoit Bassi, the managing director of Bridge- 
point Capital in Paris. He never falls in love with the com- 
panies that he targets for acquisition. In a typical year, 
Mr Bassi reviews about 150 investment ideas and filters 
them down to just a few. 
In a good year, he ends up acting on two good invest- 
ment ideas. He does not hesitate to walk away even from 
the companies that initially seemed like great invest- 
ments. 
For example, after courting FruitCo, a European com- 
pany for months and subjecting it later to a rigorous due 
diligence for several weeks, manv worms were found. 
~r kassi walked away and killed the deal himself. 
In negotiation. negotiators should restrain their 
" . " 
Some negotiators fall in love with a deal well before it was pre-conceived beliefs and not fall in love prematurely with 
analysed. Consequently, the rigour of the analysis is com- the wrong deal. 
Time pressure 
The more time a buyer has to investigate the deal, the 
more skeletons the buyer will find. Sellers, therefore, use 
time pressure to limit the due diligence process. 
For example, Rubbermaid's executives gave Newell an 
exclusive right to acquire Rubbermaid, as long as the deal 
could be done in three weeks. Newell, which already fell 
in love with Rubbermaid, accepted the condition. 
Under time pressure, Newell raced through the due dili- 
gence process and failed to discover that Rubbermaid 
"perfumed" itself: it stuffed its distribution channels by of- 
fering heavy promotions and deep discounts. It was only 
later that Newell discovered that Rubbermaid had a poor 
customer service record and weak management. 
In negotiation, time has a strategic va&e. Negotiate re- 
alistic time frames for any task related to the negotiation, 
- 
especially due diligence. 
Narrow focus 
In mergers and acquisitions deals, for example, the due 
diligence effort tends to focus on the past and the present 
of the four Cs of competition: customers, competitors, cost 
and capabilities. 
The competitive analysis, almost exclusively, is limited 
to financial, legal, and operational issues. The critical cul- 
tural, human resources and strategically forward-looking 
issues take a backseat. For example, in 1998, Safeway, a 
leading grocery chain in the US acquired Dominick's, a re- 
gional grocer in Chicago for US$1.8 billion. 
The strategic fit and synergy between them was ques- 
tionable because the grocers are different. Safeway is a ge- 
neric grocer focusing on store brands and disciplined cost 
management. Dominick's, in contrast, focused on pre- 
pared foods, in-store cafes, and product variety. 
Once Safeway took over, implemented aggressive cost 
cutting measures, and introduced its private labels goods, 
Dominick's started to lose market share. Safeway could 
not resell Dominick's for a fifth of what it had paid. 
Critically important cultural and human "soft" issues 
are ako ignored, even though as a study of 125 mergers 
and acquisition between 1996 and 2000 and greater than 
US$l billion suggested, cultural integration issues can 
make or break deals. 
Successful deal makers clearly recognise that in negoti- 
ation, effective due diligence and comprehensive planning 
are perhaps the most important tasks which should never 
be underestimated. Complex deals are multi-dimensional 
and should be studied as such. 
Perhaps a useful motto for effective preparation and 
planning is: "In God we trust. The rest bring valid data." 
The writer is an associate professor of organisational 
behaviour and human resources prac&ce a t  Singapore 
Management University and teaches negotiation. He is 
the author, co-author, and editor of several negotiation 
books, including his newly published 'Negotiation 
Excellence - Successful Deal Making' 
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